You, robot: on the linguistic construction of artificial others \ud by Coeckelbergh, Mark
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
You, robot: on the linguistic construction of artificial others
Mark Coeckelbergh
Received: 20 March 2010 / Accepted: 26 July 2010 / Published online: 10 August 2010
 The Author(s) 2010. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract How can we make sense of the idea of ‘per-
sonal’ or ‘social’ relations with robots? Starting from a
social and phenomenological approach to human–robot
relations, this paper explores how we can better under-
stand and evaluate these relations by attending to the ways
our conscious experience of the robot and the human–
robot relation is mediated by language. It is argued that
our talk about and to robots is not a mere representation
of an objective robotic or social-interactive reality, but
rather interprets and co-shapes our relation to these arti-
ficial quasi-others. Our use of language also changes as a
result of our experiences and practices. This happens
when people start talking to robots. In addition, this paper
responds to the ethical objection that talking to and with
robots is both unreal and deceptive. It is concluded that in
order to give meaning to human–robot relations, to arrive
at a more balanced ethical judgment, and to reflect on our
current form of life, we should complement existing
objective-scientific methodologies of social robotics and
interaction studies with interpretations of the words,
conversations, and stories in and about human–robot
relations.
Keywords Human–robot relations  Robot ethics 
Language  Phenomenology  Hermeneutics
1 Introduction
I love you. Do you love me?
(sentence addressed to a robotic doll, reported in Turkle et al.
2006, p. 357).
The robots are coming. But if they enter your home,
they may not kill you; there is a good chance that they
simply want a hug. Robots are no longer confined to fac-
tories, laboratories, and—increasingly—battlefields. They
gradually enter people’s daily lives, offering companion-
ship, entertainment, sex, or health care. Some people prefer
artificial friends or even artificial partners.
Although this scenario may remain science-fiction for
many of us, robots are already used in these domains and
we want to know what would happen if robots became not
only more autonomous and intelligent but also increasingly
‘personal’ or ‘social’. The scenario invites us to reflect on
what it would be like to live with ‘social robots’ (Breazeal
2003) and how we should evaluate what goes on between
humans and robots. More importantly, however, it helps us
to reflect about ourselves: what it is to be human, what we
mean by social relations, and how we should live together.
How should we understand and evaluate human–robot
relations? In response to new developments in social
robotics, there is a growing literature on human–robot
interaction and human–robot relations (Turkle et al. 2006;
Breazeal 2003; Dautenhahn et al. 2005; Dautenhahn 2007;
Levy 2007, etc.). Moreover, philosophy of information
technology—in particular robot ethics—has also started to
reflect on ‘artificial companions’ (e.g. Floridi 2008) and
their use in domains such as elderly care and health care
(e.g. Sparrow and Sparrow 2006). Some even consider
the issue of robot rights (Brooks 2000; Levy 2009; Asaro
2006; Torrance 2008) or, more generally, raise the issue
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concerning the protection of (some) robots from abuse
(Whitby 2008).
However, while becoming increasingly interdisciplin-
ary, most existing work in the area of personal and social
robotics uses methods from social science or psychology. It
remains close to the methodological naturalism of the
robotics science it relates to. Furthermore, mainly aimed at
description and explanation, it lacks a normative orienta-
tion. Can we view human relations from a different, more
distinctly philosophical perspective that takes distance
from scientific-objective approaches and contributes to the
need of evaluation?
In previous work, I proposed a social–phenomenological
approach to philosophy of robotics, which focuses on the
philosophical relevance of robotic appearance and of
human–robot relations as social relations (Coeckelbergh
2009, 2010a, b). In this paper, I wish to further develop this
approach by exploring the potential benefits of a linguistic–
hermeneutic turn in philosophy of robotics. I argue that the
appearance of robots in human consciousness is mediated
by language: how we use words interprets and co-shapes
our relation to others—human others or artificial others. In
addition, I discuss a common objection to such ‘robot talk’:
are these relations unreal and deceptive, threatening
authenticity? Then I draw conclusions for the study,
design, and ethical evaluation of human–robot relations.
In course of my arguments, I engage with empirical
research on human–robot relations, in particular the work
by Sherry Turkle.
2 Human–robot relations as social relations
Human–robot relations can be defined as social relations.
What does ‘social’ mean here? First, all robots are ‘social’ in
the sense that they play a role in human society, in the same
way as other artefacts are ‘part’ of society as instruments for
human purposes. For instance, cars play a role in society.
Second, some robots are also ‘social’ in a different sense:
they seem to participate in ‘social’ interaction with humans:
they are autonomous, interactive robots that follow social
rules and interact with humans in a human-like way. How-
ever, the sense in which I shall use ‘social’ with regard to
robots and human–robot relations concerns the conse-
quences of these interactions for the way robots appear to us.
There is a specific phenomenological sense in which some
robots can be called ‘social’: some robots appear to us as
more than instruments. They appear as ‘quasi-others’ (Ihde
1990) or artificial others. Interaction based on this appear-
ance constitutes a (quasi-)social relation between us and the
robot, regardless of the robot’s ontological status as defined
by modern science and by traditional and modern meta-
physics, which view the robot as a mere thing or machine.
For ethics, this approach implies that the moral status of
robots does no longer depend on ‘objective’ features of the
robot but on how the robot and the human–robot relation
appear to human consciousness. What matters for robot
designers who wish to design a ‘moral’ robot, then, is not
the creation of a robot mind but the creation of an
appearance-in-a-relation.
However, in order to further develop this view, we need
a more precise account of how this phenomenological
process unfolds. How is the ‘social’ appearance created?
What are the conditions under which a robot appears to us
as a quasi-other? How do we make sense of such human–
robot relations? In the next sections, I will partly fill this
gap by discussing the role of language in how robots and
human–robot relations appear to us as social. By exploring
the linguistic–hermeneutic dimension of human–robot
social phenomenology, I hope to contribute to a better
understanding and evaluation of what goes on or might go
on between humans and robots.
3 Language and the social
Let me distinguish two opposing views on the relation
between the social and language, which I shall name repre-
sentationalism and constructivism. Both views differ from
extreme idealism and naı¨ve realism, which define the rela-
tion between language and world by absorbing the one into
the other: extreme idealism (in its post-modern or structur-
alist version) ‘deletes’ the world outside language; naı¨ve
realism ‘abolishes’ the subject. Applied to the social (world),
this would mean that the social is purely linguistic–concep-
tual or that we can know the social as an objective reality.
Both views are misguided. The social exists also ‘outside’
language, although we have no unmediated access to it: we
experience it through the lens of language, we talk about it. In
this sense, language is intrinsically connected to the social.
However, the two opposing views I have in mind differ
fundamentally in the way they view this intrinsic relation.
According to the representationalist view, the social is
prior to language. The relation between the social and
language is one of representation: with words we represent
social relations. Language is a ‘mirror’ of the social.
Although we might not have direct access to the social,
language brings the social to us without distortion.
According to the constructivist view, by contrast, language
is prior to the social. The social is constructed or even
declared (Searle 1995): the speech act is prior to the social
since it creates the social. According to this view, the social
is subjective or inter-subjective in the sense that it is cre-
ated by human intention and human agreement; however,
once created it assumes an ‘objective’ character in the form
of rules, laws and (other) institutions.
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However, do we have to choose between these polar
opposites? There is no real dilemma here. Rather than
seeing either the social or language as ‘prior’, let us try to
construe a synthesis of the best insights into the two
positions. The representational view is right that the social
is not merely a matter of linguistic construction or decla-
ration; there is an extra-linguistic social reality. The social
is not merely (inter-)subjective. However, we can only
access that social reality through the medium of language
(words and concepts are ‘glasses’ through which we see
reality) and the constructivist view is right that our use of
language co-shapes that reality. Language does not mirror
the social; it also helps to create it. Moreover, even apart
from this more ‘active’ dimension of language, the medi-
ating role of language is not restricted to representation (or
is not even adequately described as such): we also interpret
the social. We can have different readings of social insti-
tutions and practices. In both cases, knowing the social
requires an ‘act’ of interpretation or even construction.
4 Natural language and artificial companions
Applied to human–robot relations, this linguistic–herme-
neutic perspective implies that it is consistent to hold the
following two claims in conjunction: (1) our use of lan-
guage constructs human–robot relations (understood as
social relations) and (2) these relations have also an extra-
linguistic dimension: the relations take on a quasi-objective
reality but are not directly accessible to experience: they
appear to us through the medium of language and are
interpreted by us using the medium of language.
This argument about linguistic mediation reveals the
possibility of at least two different linguistic-phenomen-
ological ‘glasses’ or repertoires (or what Searle calls ‘status
functions’) for relating to robots: we can see them as
‘things’ and declare them to be mere objects or machines,
but we can also construct them as quasi-others. The first
repertoire constitutes an ontology in which there is a strict
division between (human) subjects and (robotic) objects
(and between physical ontology and human-social ontol-
ogy, as in Searle’s work on social ontology1), whereas the
second repertoire creates a social ontology of human–robot
relations that is more ‘hybrid’ in nature. This ontological
hybridity ‘shows up’ in language (language as representa-
tion and interpretation) but at the same it is also con-
structed by language.
We cannot simply choose between these two possibili-
ties or repertoires. In this sense Searle’s language of
‘declaration’ is misleading. We might declare whatever we
want; experience can push us—that is, our language use
and hence the social relation—in a different direction. In
current human–robot relations, we can observe a shift from
talking about robots and about human–robot relations to
talking to robots. Let me explain this shift and bring out its
linguistic dimension and philosophical significance by
distinguishing between different ‘perspectives’.
4.1 Talking about human–robot relations
Consider the following example. The idea of ‘love’,
friendship’ or ‘marriage’ between humans and robots raises
ethical questions (e.g. Levy 2007). Is love for robots real
love? Is sex with robots acceptable? Some people feel it is
even offensive to talk about it.
However, the question whether there can be real love
between humans and robots is not the right question, since it
assumes that such ‘love’ would be an objective reality that
stands apart from our human–robot experiences and practices.
Imagine that one day we declare a particular human–robot
relation to be a ‘love’ relation. We might even declare a
particular human and a particular robot ‘married’. In this
sense, love with robots would be a social, linguistic con-
struction. However, if this were to happen, it would only
happen on the condition that the relation already appears to us
and is interpreted by us as a ‘love’ relation in virtue of what
really happens between the natural and the artificial ‘part-
ners’. A different phenomenology and interpretation may not
warrant the same declaration; it would render the ‘declara-
tion’ empty, devoid of meaning (most current robots are not
experienced by us as deserving our love and affection). But
this is also true for human relations: we cannot ‘simply’ or
‘merely’ change the social by means of declaration; such a
declaration has to be integrated with experience.
Note that a similar argument could be made for robot
rights: a declaration of robot rights only makes sense if and
only if the phenomenological–hermeneutic process, which
is partly and importantly linguistic in nature (but not
merely linguistic), supports the declaration. (For designers
who aim at creating robots that warrant a declaration of
rights, this means that the robot would have to have fea-
tures that trigger this interpretative and declarative move.
However, I will not further develop this point here.)
This argument suggests a novel way of looking at
human–robot relations. Based on social-linguistic inter-
pretations and constructions, one may distinguish the fol-
lowing perspectives on language and robots.
1 A full response to, and engagement with, Searle’s work on social
ontology will require a longer work. For the purpose of this argument
it suffices to say that Searle holds a ‘dualist’ view in the sense that he
applies an objectivist approach to physical reality but a constructivist
approach to social reality. The version of constructivism I explore in
this paper, while remaining agnostic about the ultimate nature of
reality, questions Searle’s dualist view. It suggests that we do not
have unmediated access to any reality—‘objective’ reality or ‘facts’
have to be interpreted and constructed for them to become what we
call knowledge.
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Impersonal third-person perspective (‘‘it’’) and first-
person perspective (I, robot): The usual AI (artificial
intelligence) perspective on language and robotics taken by
robotics researchers focuses on programming (the ability
of) natural language into a robot, that is, it is concerned
with how the robots (‘‘it’’) talks, could talk, and should
talk. If language is considered by designers and users of
robots and other artificial systems, they mainly worry about
what the robot says or could (not) say. The dream of tra-
ditional AI (and of contemporary complaints departments
of large companies) was to build artificially intelligent
systems that would be indistinguishable from a natural
language user. Consider discussions about Turing’s game
(Turing 1950) or Searle’s Chinese Room experiment
(Searle 1980): the question is whether we can tell the dif-
ference between a human and a robot based on their use of
natural language. The ultimate dream, then, is to build a
conscious robot who says ‘I, robot’ (as in the title of a
science-fiction film). Then there will be a first-person
perspective: robots may declare that they are conscious and
perhaps demand their rights.
However, the approach I propose here pays attention to
how humans talk about robots. This shifts the focus from
what the robot says to what humans say.
4.2 Talking about robots
Third-person perspective. As the development of robotics
continues and robots become more ‘personal’, designers
and users may shift from the first-person perspective (in the
sense of trying to put a human-like mind into the robot) to
the third-person perspective and from the impersonal pro-
noun to the personal pronoun. People no longer consider
the robot as a machine and start to refer to robots in per-
sonal terms. ‘‘It’’ becomes ‘‘he’’ or ‘‘she’’. We might say
that ‘‘he’’ wants attention or food that ‘‘she’’ did something
to me, and so on. (A similar process happens when we deal
with intelligent animals. Some people also use this lan-
guage when they talk to cars and other things.)
4.3 Talking to robots
Second-person perspective (You, robot): A next step
(which also happens in some human–animal relations) is
that we do not only talk about the robot but also talk to the
robot. Here the robot is fully appearing as a quasi-other,
being acknowledged as a quasi-other, and being con-
structed as a quasi-other. Speech is directed to the robot,
not only to humans. We can easily imagine a human person
addressing her companion or partner robot with ‘‘you’’.
Such a person can only do that given what the appearance
of the robot ‘does’ to her. At the same time, by addressing
the robot in this way, the robot and the relation are
constructed as companion and as partner relation (exam-
ples drawn from empirical research follow below).
If the robot appears as a quasi-subject, with its own
consciousness, needs, desires, and thoughts, this might
even develop into the appearance of (quasi-)inter-subjec-
tivity. If the robot talks back, a ‘dialogue’ is created. Then
we have the impression not only that we are talking to the
robot but that we are talking with the robot—an experience
that is similar to talking with human social others. Here we
might declare our interaction to be a ‘discussion’ or ‘con-
versation’. Humans might refer to themselves and the robot
as ‘‘we’’ (first-person plural) when talking to a human or
artificial other. Someone may say: ‘‘we’’ have discussed
this; ‘‘we’’ had a good time (however, I will not further
develop this suggestion here and mainly focus on the
second-person perspective).
This approach to human relations has several implica-
tions for researchers and designers in the field of social
robotics.
5 Implications for the study and evaluation
of human–robot relations
First, the approach pays more attention to how people
speak about and to robots. Our ‘robot talk’ is not neutral
but interprets and shapes our relations with robots; it has a
hermeneutic and normative function.
This insight can throw new light on existing research in
the field of social robotics. For example, research by Turkle
and others reports elderly people and children talking to
robots (Turkle 2005; Turkle et al. 2006). For example, one
of the residents of a nursing home says to the robotic doll
My Real Baby: ‘‘I love you. Do you love me?’’ (Turkle
et al. 2006, p. 357). Turkle concludes from this and other
observations that there is a great degree of attachment to
robots as ‘relational artefacts’, as tools to build relation-
ships. They can help to relate people. Turkle’s research
also shows that people talk to robots as ‘evocative objects’
that remind them about humans who play or played a role
in their lives.
However, next to these ways of relating to robots there
is also the possibility that the robot comes to be regarded as
a unique artificial other rather than a tool or an evocation of
a human other. This ‘use’ is not well-researched yet but is
indicated when Turkle suggests that people who develop
such attachments want robots to talk back to them, e.g. say
one’s name or say ‘I love you’ back to them: ‘Elders may
come to love the robots that care for them, and it may be
too frustrating if the robot does not say the words ‘‘I love
you’’ back’ (Turkle et al. 2006, p. 360). (However, she
recognises that this does not feel completely comfortable
and that it raises the issue of authenticity. I return to a
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similar ethical issue below.) It seems that an expectation
arises within a social relation. The robot becomes a
‘you’—not as a stand-in for someone else (which we might
call a ‘delegated second-person’) but a ‘you’ in its own
right, an artificial second-person, which has a claim on me
as a social being. Based on what I have said previously, we
can understand this talking to robots as changing and
shaping the human–robot relation as a social relation:
people talk to robots not only because of the ‘personal’ or
‘social’ appearance of the robot (produced by the robot
having certain features and capacities for certain behav-
iours); by talking to the robot in second-person terms, they
also construct it as a quasi-other. Partly by using language
in this way (e.g. using the words ‘‘you’’ and ‘‘love’’), the
robot does no longer appear to the elderly person as an
object but as a quasi-other. This creates a social reality: it
produces expectations that co-shape the quasi-social rela-
tion and are therefore no longer ‘merely subjective’.
This might not only throw new light on existing
research, it can also suggest new research questions. For
example, I suggest that we test the following hypothesis:
the linguistic pre-construction of the human–robot relation
(as a social relation) influences, co-constructs the actual
relation. Usually researchers manipulate the (parameters of
the) interaction and then see what happens in terms of
language use, e.g. what people say to the robot. I propose to
turn that around: manipulate the linguistic ‘environment’
and then see what happens to the interaction. For instance,
what happens when the instructor already pre-defines the
interaction as a ‘personal’ or ‘social’ relation by using
words such as ‘‘she’’ or ‘‘he’’ or by giving the robot a
name? Does the result differ from what happens in a
control group (where the instructor uses ‘‘it’’ and the
robot’s factory ‘name’)? Moreover, to explore the herme-
neutic dimension one would need to conduct long-term
studies of human–robot relations—with all their interpre-
tations and narratives—as opposed to current short-term
interaction studies.
Second, since languages and the cultures in which these
languages are embedded differ, this approach naturally
suggests paying attention to cultural differences. For
example, many other languages have not one but two or
more second-person forms. English has ‘‘you’’, but in
Dutch there is a difference between ‘‘you’’ (informal) and
‘‘u’’ (more formal and polite). Consider also the German
‘‘du’’ and ‘‘Sie’’, the French ‘‘tu’’ and ‘‘vous’’, or the Hindi
‘‘tum’’ and ‘‘aap’’. Other languages may have a larger set of
linguistic–social possibilities. Which forms are used and
indeed should be used to address artificial others? These
descriptive and normative questions are important since the
precise form used expresses but also constitutes the social
relations and structures. For example, with our words we
might imply and constitute a master–slave relation or a
companion relation. There is also a gender dimension to
this: when we address the robot from a third-person
perspective, do we use ‘‘he’’ or ‘‘she’’?
Language has a normative dimension, prescriptive
dimension: words are related to ways of doing things. With
Wittgenstein we might want to call these ways of doing
things ‘forms of life’ (Wittgenstein 1953). Language and
culture are closely connected. The meaning of words is
created by language use and practices; at the same time
language also shapes these practices. The way we do
things, the form it takes (culture), depends on language. To
imagine relations between humans and robots is to imagine
a form of life: one that includes both human–human rela-
tions, human–robot relations, and the clouds of words and
meaning that surround them. This form would probably
partly mirror that of human–human relations, as suggested
by the use of personal pronouns. That use is derived from
how humans address one another. However, we also need
to explore if and how human–robot relations may trans-
form how we do things; they could contribute to a new
form of life. Moreover, we may try to imagine what it
would mean if robots had their own way of doing things, if
they developed their own form of (artificial) life.
This may be hard to imagine for us. ‘Robot talk’ is very
much connected to the worldviews/ontologies—including
social ontologies—of the culture in which it vibrates. For
example, in the West we tend to put a lot of emphasis on
the subject–object distinction and most of us hold indi-
vidualistic, non-relational ontologies. Robots are assigned
to the ‘object’ category, humans to the ‘subject’ category.
No crossovers or hybrids are allowed in this modern,
dualist ontology; purity is preserved.2 Languages already
‘contain’ such ontologies in their structures. Our linguistic
grammar is also a moral, social and ontological ‘grammar’.
Consider again the use of pronouns and the subject/object
distinction in Western languages: the language we use co-
shapes how we interpret and construct the social. This sets
limits to imagining, shaping, exploring, and experiencing
new forms of life in which robots assume the role of arti-
ficial others. At the same time, language is not fixed and
our words and concepts can and do change as a result of
changing social relations. For example, we can start using
personal pronouns in our robot talk. How these relations
change is partly but not entirely up to us. We cannot simply
or entirely change our form of life. Living in a particular
culture, being part of a particular generation, being the
particular person one is, and so on, will influence the lan-
guage one uses and how that language changes (I return to
this point).
Third, therefore, this approach promotes the study of
changes in human–robot relations. They change as a result
2 See also the work of Latour (1993).
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of many factors but are also and partly changing due to the
ways we speak about robots and due to our declarations
concerning these relations.
This approach brings in the time dimension and the
personal identity dimension: it implies that there can be
(hi)stories about human–robot relations (fictional and non-
fictional) in which we interpret and shape human and robot
identities and the relations in which these identities are
embedded. We might use ‘‘they’’ when talking about a
particular human–robot relation (with ‘‘they’’ referring to
the human and the robot) or even the first-person ‘‘we’’.
For instance, people might refer to a man and his robot as
‘‘they’’ when there appears to be a personal, social relation
between the two. The relation then assumes a kind of
collective identity, in the same way as a couple of humans
are collected by the word ‘‘they’’ (‘‘I think they should get
married’’) (see also my point about inter-subjectivity in the
previous section).
Robotics designers and scientists are advised to take
these aspects into account when they consider use of
robots: use does not only depend on the ‘object’ as such but
on how that object appears to humans and how this
appearance is mediated and shaped by human subjects and
their use of language.
From a normative-ethical point of view, we may then
ask: how should people talk about robots? An answer to
this question can inform robot design. It might turn out, for
instance, that there are good reasons why we should not
want robots to appear as others or as persons, that we
should not want that people talk about them or to them in
this way. To explore this issue, let me end with a discussion
of one ethical objection to personal robots. This will not
only allow me to say more on human–robot relations; it
will also give me an opportunity to show one way how the
approach proposed here can contribute to the study and
evaluation of human relations.
6 The deception objection to personal robots
One possible objection to personal robots (and the related
linguistic–conceptual changes I discussed) concerns the
dual charge that these robots, human–robot relations,
human–robot ‘conversations’, etc. are not really persons,
not really (social) relations or conversations (i.e. are
inauthentic), and that giving them to people would be a
matter of deception.
Although I am sympathetic to this objection, I doubt if
it is tenable in its current form for the following reasons.
This objection assumes at least the following: (1) that
talking to things is always and necessarily morally prob-
lematic, (2) that only human relations are real, true, and
authentic, (3) that there is an objective, external point of
view that allows us to judge the reality and truth of the
human–robot relation, and (4) that to say that the robot is a
thing is completely unproblematic. But these assumptions
must be questioned.
First, many people already talk to things and other non-
humans and this is not generally regarded as a moral
problem. People talk to plants, animals, dolls, cars, navi-
gation systems, DVD players, and—as Turkle already
observed in the 1980s—computers (Turkle 1984).3 When
people address current robots using a second-person per-
spective (‘‘you’’), the linguistic from is the same. Of course
robots are embodied and relational objects invite more
affective and social engagement (e.g. nurturing, see Turkle
et al. 2006, p. 348), but it is not clear why this renders
talking to robots itself fundamentally more morally prob-
lematic. In both cases, the object is experienced and treated
as a quasi-other, there is only a gradual difference. Robots,
to the extent that they are more interactive, invite strong(er)
quasi-other experiences. In this sense, they are more
‘deceptive’ indeed. Further study of how we experience
and treat different kinds of artefacts is needed, but at first
sight the kind of ‘deception’ by robots as compared to the
‘deception’ involved when someone talks to a plant does
not seem to be fundamentally different in kind.4
One might object that still the ‘perception’ of the robot
is not real or not true. But what is more real or true: the
(abstract) definition of a robot as an object or the actual
experience of the robot as a quasi-other? From a con-
structive-phenomenological point of view, there is no ready
and a priori answer to this question.
Paradoxically, those who are most outraged at the
thought of talking to robots must have a strong quasi-other
experience. If people really believed that the robots in
question are ‘mere objects’, they would not have a moral
problem with (others) talking to them. They would find it
‘silly’ or ‘childish’, or perhaps even ‘insane’, but they
would not count it as morally problematic. The moral
question arises only when the appearance as quasi-other
3 Note that some of these entities ‘talk to us’, for instance a
navigation system in a car. Whether or not this is to be considered
‘talk’, it also shapes the particular human-technology relation that
develops. There are many ways an artefact can ‘communicate’ to us
and presumably each has its influence on the way we do things and
perceive our environment. Note also that robot communication might
partly happen by means of ‘body language’. If robot designers want to
mimic human communication at all (they can make other design
choices), this is an important aspect that should be taken into
consideration.
4 The only exception I can think of is the possibility that sometimes
people talk to robots or plants not because the robot, plant, or other
object appears as a quasi-other but because they use it as an
instrument to order their thoughts, to talk with themselves, to have an
internal dialogue—indeed to think. Then the robot appears as a
representation of an ‘internal’ dialogue partner, it is ‘internalised’ as
an extension of the inner conversation.
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has already taken place. The ethical issues arise when,
phenomenologically speaking, the robot moves into the
twilight zone between object and subject: it appears as
‘more’ than an object yet ‘less’ than a subject. For instance,
sex robots can come to be seen as morally problematic only
if they already appear as quasi-others. If they were inter-
preted or experienced as mere tools used in sexual activi-
ties, they would not receive the same outrage.5
Second, is reliance on appearance in social relations as
such morally problematic? Appearance plays an important
role in human–human relations. We do not always ‘really
know’ the persons we socially engage with, yet appearance
lubricates our inter-human social relations. Of course, we
sometimes say that while someone appeared such and
such, the person really is such and such. But how do we
determine the real, the true or the authentic? Do we have
unmediated access to pure reality, to the truth about a
personal core, to an authentic self? The answer to this
question is at least more complex than the objection
suggests.
Third, one answer to this perennial philosophical ques-
tion is the following. What we ‘have’ for sure are
appearances of robots, of (ourselves as) humans, and of our
relations to robots. Whether we can have access to any-
thing else depends on whether we have an objective,
external point of view outside the relations as they appear
to us. However, both our view of human relations and our
view of human–robot relations do not stand entirely apart
from these relations themselves. Following from the
arguments outlined in the previous sections, our response
must be that our talk to humans and our talk to robots are
not neutral vis-a`-vis how we define the real and the truth
and how and shape these relations. This does not imply that
no meaning can be given to these terms, but rather that
knowledge of the real or the true concerning humans and
robot is not obvious, not given, and must be carefully
constructed by taking into account concrete experience as
appearances-in-relation.
Fourth, to say that robots ‘‘are’’ ‘‘mere’’ objects is not
trivial and not unproblematic. As the previous discussion
suggests, our resistance to talking to robots or talking with
robots is shaped by (1) our experience of robots as mere
machines (similar to the way Descartes could only expe-
rience animals as machines) and (2) our Western outlook
on relations between humans and non-humans rooted in an
ontology that makes strict subject/object distinctions and
therefore excludes the possibility of ‘hybrids’ such as
robots as quasi-others. However, while our current expe-
riences and conceptual frameworks prevent us from seeing
robots differently, this might change in the future. As new
kinds of robots are being developed and used, both our
language and our experiences change and mutually influ-
ence one another. If we take this cultural and dynamic
aspect into account in our evaluations, this might render
these evaluations less stable than we would want them to
be from a theoretical point of view, but they will be more
relevant and better able to guide our decisions concerning
the future.
Thus, although these experiential and conceptual chan-
ges are not entirely up to us since we cannot fully control
the development of technology, social experience, cultural
meaning, and personality, this position does not imply that
we have to uncritically accept technological and linguistic–
conceptual changes. The ethical-technological task we face
is to try to guide, steer, and shape these changes in a
desirable direction. However, our aim cannot be deter-
mined from an objective point of nowhere. Instead, from
within our current situated frameworks, we must explore,
imagine, and evaluate different human–robot possibilities:
different kinds of robots and human–robot relations, per-
haps different forms of life. Of course we might judge
some possibilities to be ethically unacceptable. However,
the intuitions and values we currently rely on to evaluate
these possibilities are not fixed but can also change as
possibilities and realities change. We might change our
values or interpret them differently once other relational
possibilities show up. We can only arrive at judgment
within this dynamic, historical and interpretative moral-
technological constellation. In the absence of the possi-
bility to arrive at eternal, objective truths, our judgment
must always remain provisional and vulnerable to criticism
and challenge.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I have explored a linguistic–hermeneutic turn
to the study and evaluation of human–robot relations. In
this way, I have opened up a perspective that differs from a
scientific ‘objective’ approach but at the same time attends
to concrete human–robot practices, experiences, conver-
sations, and stories.
Some robots are revealed as artefacts that are co-con-
structed in at least the following ways: they are at the
same time engineering constructs and social-linguistic
constructs. Their appearance creates social relations that
are linguistically mediated. The language we use allows us
to take different perspectives on the robot: the language we
use reveals the robot as an ‘‘it’’ but sometimes also as a
‘‘you’’.
Which way of approaching robots has epistemic prior-
ity? Which one is truer: ‘‘it’’ or ‘‘you’’? Although I am
sympathetic to those who answer ‘‘it’’, I suspect that this is
the wrong question if we consider (knowledge construction5 Levy puts sex robots within the history of sex aids (Levy 2007).
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in) concrete human–robot practices. Quite similar to
Gestalt switching,6 we are very well able to switch between
these perspectives (but we cannot see them at the same
time) and none of the Gestalts has epistemic priority.
Depending on the culture and language we live in, one or
the other perspective will be used more frequently, but
there is no a priori order between the robot-as-thing and the
robot-as-quasi-other.
Thus, to acknowledge the linguistic–cultural construc-
tion of robots and robot relations is limiting and freedom-
enhancing at the same time. On the one hand, our practices
and thinking are already embedded in a culture, in forms of
life. On the other hand, once we are aware of the ‘gram-
mar’ and what it does to us, we can try to stretch our
language and thinking when exploring the implications of
social robots and other technologies.
However, is there an ethical priority with regard to lan-
guage use? Are there moral limits to linguistic–cultural
imagination and practice? For instance, is it morally prob-
lematic to use the ‘‘you’’ perspective in relation to an arte-
fact? From the previous discussion of the deception
objection, we can conclude that using ‘‘you’’ is at least not
obviously morally wrong. However, it may be that in relation
to some technologies some uses of language and indeed some
forms of life are morally unacceptable. It may be that some
forms of life are to be preferred over others. In any case,
further reflections on this issue should take into account how
we talk to things (usually not seen as morally problematic),
the role of appearance in human–human relations (again,
usually not seen as very morally problematic), hard episte-
mological problems with notions such as the real, the true,
and the authentic, and the dynamic nature of technological,
societal, linguistic, and cultural possibilities.
Although this discussion raises many further questions,
a social-phenomenological approach and the ‘linguistic
turn’ proposed here seem promising conceptual tools to
enhance our understanding of what goes on when we talk
to robots. As such they can usefully inform, complement,
and perhaps revise existing empirical approaches in inter-
action studies and social robotics. They may also assist
philosophers of robotics to make sense of, and evaluate, the
‘personal’ and ‘social’ dimension of living with robots.
They can make users aware of the variety of repertoires and
perspectives that can be used in relating to robots. And
even if the scenarios mentioned in the introduction remain
science-fiction, we may transfer some insights from this
discussion to understanding our relations to other tech-
nologies and artefacts.
Finally, any reconstruction of the object is likely to
influence the construction of the subject. The emergence
and adoption of more ‘personal’ or ‘social’ linguistic
repertoires in human–robot practices may actually change
the subject’s understanding of itself. If a robot appears as a
quasi-other, then the human subject can no longer under-
stand itself as a ‘user’, as the one who controls the robot-as-
instrument; instead, it is likely to re-constitute itself as a
social actor living with (and living in the eyes of) the
artificial social other. Talking to robots thus changes talk-
ing about humans—perhaps also to humans. The language
we use reveals and shapes the social ontologies in which
we live as much as it reveals and shapes ourselves.
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